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∂ γ
∂γ
z( )
≥ 0 (A.4)
Equations (A.3) and (A.4) represent necessary and sufficient conditions for truthful
revelation. They may be rewritten as equations (27) and (28) respectively. Let U(γ)=t(γ)-
ψ (γ-z(γ)) denote type γ's rent. The envelop theorem applied to the maximization of
(A.1) with respect to γ* yields expression (27). Expression (28) derives from (A.4) as
long as we note that e(γ)=-z(γ).
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arguments. Privatisation might be an answer to the enormous costs of organizations in
charge of achieving the second-best.
Actually the experiences of deregulation showed that regulation through competition
does not alone imply socially desireable consequences in the transit market. Moreover
deregulation does not necessarily mean that transit subsidies are completely eliminated.
Even in a privatized transit market, a local government may decide to give public
subsidies in return for a socially superior transit service. From this point of view, the
second aim of this paper was to suggest a new framework to define regulatory contracts
that assign transfers to the transit firms according to the achievement of announced
performance. The same reasoning is valid, a-fortiori, in the case of a publicly owned
transit firm. The Theory of Incentives might provide the appropriate framework for
analyzing such arrangements, i.e. to give a third-best answer to public transit problems
that also take into consideration organizational constraints.
APPENDIX: FIRST AND SECOND ORDER CONDITIONS FOR TRUTHFUL
REVELATION
The firm is faced with the contract [t(γ),c(γ),p(γ),q(γ)]. It chooses the announcement 
γ° that maximizes its objective function, that is, solves:
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Thus, first order conditions of incentive compatibility is:
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and the second order condition is:
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4.3. Open issues
According to the theory, all these experiences more or less failed to provide the
proper incentives to the firms. This  failure can be explained in two ways: 1) regulators do
not know the incentives theory, 2) this theoretical test is much too demanding in that
incentives theory does not account for all the complexities. Assuming that the answer lies
somewhere in between, transport economists have two main tasks to accomplish: 1) to
teach incentives theory to regulators and planners; 2) to improve it in order to correspond
to reality. In this last case there are two main aspects of real transit subsidization schemes
that must be carefully considered: dynamic contracting and endogeneity of reservation
utility levels.
The first aspect, which is common to the subsidization of both private and public
enterprises emerges if we consider that subsidization is usually part of a multiperiod
relationship. In this context it might be quite difficult to let the agent reveal its own
private information as long as the regulatory contract could be renegotiated or stipulated
year by year. In such a case truthful revelation today implies to loose informational rents
tomorrow.
The second issue may arise whenever subsidization involves a multiplicity of agents.
The consistency of each menu of transfers might be undermined by an externality effect.
The theory says that incentive contracts depend on the reservation level of utility, that is
determined, for each agent, by his best alternative to signing the contract. It may be that
this alternative depends on the number of agents that refuse to sign: the more agents
refuse to sign the more easily they can cooperate in enforcing the regulator to implement a
new more favourable subsidization scheme. Therefore reservation levels of utility may be
influenced also by the extent of cooperation in refusing the contract and by the degree of
rent extraction in itself.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was twofold. First of all we aimed to evaluate the theories of
public transit subsidization. After an early, abundance of contributions to the literature of
Public Transit Economics mainly inspired by Welfare Theory and Public Economics, in
the last decade the issue of transit privatisation determined a shift towards different
theoretical paradigms. Transport economists debated about the opportunity of privatising
public transit firms by referring very frequently to the Theory of Industrial Organization.
This change has been implicitly determined by a shift from second-best to first-best
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ratio. This system, introduced in 1979, was later abandoned. Opposition arose because it
was far easier for smaller firms to qualify for the incentive reward33.
By referring to the theory of incentives, it is quite easy to see why these attempts
failed: the regulator imposed the same contract on each firm. Therefore individual
rationality and incentive compatibility constraints were not considered. This feature
reveals that the underlying theory was still the standard welfarist approach, in that there
was no concern for organizational aspects.
A slightly improved version of performance-based transit subsidization has been
recently introduced in Emilia-Romagna. In Italy each regional transit authority receives a
transfer from the central government that must be allocated to local transit firms34 to cover
their deficits. Usually this is done by political negotiations on historical sharing quotas. At
the beginning of 1995, Emilia-Romagna regional authority accomplished this task by
stipulating, separately with each local transit firm, incentive contracts (Contratti di
Servizio). These contracts have the above-mentioned prescribed form, since they consist
of a fixed payment plus a penalty, or bonus, component contingent on performance
overruns.
Even if in theory this scheme is sound, in practice it suffers from at least three main
drawbacks. 1) Performance is evaluated on the basis of 10 indicators calculated with data
provided by each firm. 2) The penalty rate is set at the same value for each firm. In fact,
the regional authority negotiated assuming that each firm should have been rewarded on
the basis of the same penalty rates. 3) The penalty rate is very low, only 1% of the total
eligible subsidy. Thus the contracts are all fixed-price transfers.
The first failure is quite evident since firms may give false report. The second is
partly a consequence of the first: the penalty rate should not provide different incentives
to false reporting. Finally the third drawback is a direct result of the second: if the penalty
rate must be the same, then the firms collectively opt for the lowest one, that is for a
fixed-price contract. This high powered contract allows the highest rent to be realized.
From incentive theory we know that this contract induces the socially correct amount of
effort in the most efficient type but may leave too high a rent to the low efficient ones.
Therefore in the end this arrangement fails both in extracting rents and inducing effort at a
socially desireable level. However it is still better than those surveyed by Fielding in that
at least each firm deliberatly signs its own contract.
                                               
33
 More recently, Los Angeles county designed a similar subsidization scheme that had the same fate.
34
 In Italy local transit firms are publicly owned.
Public Transit Subsidy: from the Economics of Welfare to the Theory of Incentives 23
problem might be solved quite easily. As long as the firm has the incentive to boost
current sales, consumption is a signal of quality. In this situation, incentives to provide
quality might be disconnected from those to reduce cost, if the firm is rewarded also on
the basis of sales. We have seen therefore that an important role might be played by
observed performance indicators directly linked to consumption. Moreover we have
shown that the power of the incentive scheme should be determined by the regulator
depending on the a-priori probabilistic knowledge of unobservable cost and demand
parameters. High powered schemes should be given to firms with lower productive
inefficiency and high demand parameters. This implies that high powered schemes should
be dependent on low cost and high sales announced performance. An important question
is to identify the more appropriate ex-post observable performance measures. An obvious
choice would be to use only indicators that are easy to audit31. An alternative would be to
introduce performance assessment on the basis of information provided by a third party
(panel of users, firm's input suppliers, ..).
These general rules can be immediately applied by a regulator dealing with a private
transit firm. On the contrary, some complications arise if the regulator wants to apply
these rules to the design of performance-based subsidization for a system of publicly
owned transit firms.  We will briefly discuss these problems after having presented some
of these experiences.
4.2. Some experiments with performance-based transit subsidization
Fielding (1992) surveys some of the experiments with performance-based transit
subsidization carried out in the United States. All the cases he explicitly refers to were
unsuccessful.
In Michigan the state transit authority calculated 47 indicators of transit performance.
The mean, range and standard deviation for each indicator was calculated and each transit
firm rewarded on the basis of its relative status in these rankings. The scheme failed
because the use of so many indicators created confusion.
The state of Pennsylvania32 was a very interesting example. Four indicators were
calculated for each firm to cover the efficiency and effectiveness dimensions: cost per
hour, revenue per hour, ridership per hour and the revenue-to-cost ratio. The state
awarded 8.33% of the permissable deficit of each firm as a perfomance incentive, if the
firm had maintained or improved performance over the previous year on the first three
measures. To qualify for the incentive, a firm had to exceed a statewide revenue-to-cost
                                               
31See Pedersen (1994) on this regard.
32
 See Miller (1980).
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As long as we are explicitly referring to the theory of incentives as a normative paradigm,
we identify conditions for the success of such schemes with the assumptions and
normative prescriptions of that theory.
In order to be successful, the contract set by a regulator must be voluntarily accepted
by the regulated firm. Moreover the regulator should not be able to withdraw his initial
offer once it is accepted by the firm. Once these conditions have been met, the regulator
and the regulated firm enter in a mechanism design game that can be solved in the way we
showed in the previous section. The firm voluntarily accepts the contract as long as the
regulator sets it in a way to leave her at least as well as she would have been if she had not
accepted it. In order to exclude renegotiation the regulator should have a reputation
incentive, i.e. it should be better for him not to reject the contract once accepted by the
firm as long as he wishes to have the reputation for respecting agreements. Therefore, as a
first set of prescriptions the theory suggests that the regulator:
1) quantifies the firm's reservation level of utility and considers it carefully while
defining the contract;
2) invests in a reputation for respecting agreements. In this way the regulator will be
commited to a non-renegotiation behaviour and will therefore be able to propose
credible contracts, i.e. contracts that may induce truthful revelation.
A second general guideline is to give each firm its own contract, i.e. a contract
properly tailored to the firm's information. Therefore there should be one contract for each
firm. A properly defined contract induces truthful revelation, i.e. solves problems due to
asymmetry of information. This implies that it should have a particular structure. We have
seen that it might be defined as a transfer, linear in the realized, observed performance
index, with a target rent, or fixed price component, plus a penalty, or bonus component,
for performance overruns. Moreover we have seen that each contract must be defined as a
menu of linear transfers, so that each firm might choose its own incentive transfer out of a
menu of such transfers. The firm selects the target fixed price and the corresponding
reward (penalty) rate by announcing its performance target. If the regulator properly
calibrates these two parameters both conditional on the performace target announced by
the firm, he might induce the firm to self-select, i.e. to announce the truthful performance
target.
In relation to the specific regulation problem faced in the transit sector, we argue that
a fundamental concern is quality. As long as transfers can not be made to depend on
quality, since it cannot be oserved by the regulator, we have seen that the regulation
problem can be represented as a two-dimensional moral hazard and two-dimensional
adverse selection model. However we have shown that as long as the service is a search
good, i.e. its quality is observed by users before use, this fairly complicated regulation
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It is interesting to note that the menu of linear contracts can be alternatively
decomposed into a linear sharing of total cost overruns with a coefficient b1(γ)=ψ'(e*(γ
))/q*(γ) and a linear sharing of overruns in the service quality index with coefficient b2(γ
)=ψ '(e*(γ)), or
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Moreover it can be demonstrated (see Laffont and Tirole (1993) that:
1) The fixed payment a(z) is a concave, increasing function of the parameters
characterizing the power of the incentive schemes, b1 and b2.
2) The parameters characterizing the power of the incentive schemes b1 and b2, are
positively correlated over the sample of types.
The more "efficient" type , faces a fixed price transfer, with b1=ψ '(e*(γ))/q=1/q,
b2=ψ'(e*(γ))=1 and a set at the highest level, and is therefore residual claimant for its cost
savings and sales increases. The other types will face incentive contracts that are
intermediate between the fixed-price and the cost-plus contract.
4. INCENTIVE PROGRAMS IN PRACTICE
In this last section we wish to provide some general guidelines for the adoption of
incentive schemes in public transit subsidization. We will not deal with the difficult
questions regarding the design of "real" incentive contracts30. This is out of the scope of
the paper and might be the subject of further research. We prefer here just to define some
requirements from the previous treatment of the incentive approach. These criteria might
be useful to understand old and current experiments with performance-based public transit
subsidization.
4.1. General rules for incentive contract in the public transit sector
The publicly managed transit sector typically suffers from high deficits associated
with low performance. It is thus quite obvious that incentive subsidization has been
repeatedly advocated, and will be increasingly promoted, by local government in charge
of financing these deficits. Therefore it is very important to understand, especially for the
publicly managed transit firms, what makes an incentive subsidization scheme successful.
                                               
30See the paper by Reichelstein (1992) for a rare example of numerical computation of the incentive
schemes for a government contract.
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Therefore the transfer is a decreasing function of z. Moreover it can be demonstrated (see
Laffont and Tirole (1993), appendix A4.3) that differentiating (34) the transfer as a
function of z is also a convex function. Since T(z) is convex it can be replaced by the
family of its tangents. These tangents represent a menu of contracts that are linear in the
observed value of z.
t(γ°,z)=t*(γ°)+T'[z-z(γ°)]=t*(γ°)+ψ '(e*(γ°))[z(γ°)-z] (35)
where γ° is a firm's announcement and γ* denotes solutions to the optimal regulatory
contract. Thus the transfer function t(γ) can be replaced by the menu of linear contracts:
t(γ,z)=a(γ)+b(γ)[z(γ)-z] (36)
where z(γ) is the announced value of C/q-[p-A+Bq]/k, z is the observed ex-post value. The
transfer is therefore a function of a performance index that subtracts from the realized cost
an approximation of the service quality inferred from market data. In other words, the
firm is offered a choice in a menu of linear contracts and is rewarded or penalized
according to deviations from an index aggregating cost data and service quality data
inferred from observation of market price and quantity and from a priori knowledge of the
demand function.
The menu of linear contracts (36) induces truth telling and the optimal level of effort.
The firm is in fact solving the following problem:
max *( ) ' ( *( )) ( ) ( )
,e
U t e z e e
γ
γ ψ γ γ γ ψ
°
= ° + ° ° − + −
l q
m r  (37)
which implies that ψ'(e*(γ°))=ψ'(e) and therefore e=e*(γ°) and (∂ t*/∂ γ°)+ψ''(∂ e*/∂
γ°)[z(γ°)-z]+ψ'(e*(γ°)(∂ z/∂ γ°)=0. From (33) it follows that (∂ t*/∂ γ°)+ψ'(e*(γ°)(∂
z/∂ γ°)=0 and then for any γ the firm reveals γ°=γ in order to have z(γ°)=z. Moreover
from this follows that the optimal conditions for q and p hold. Therefore the direct
revelation contract  [t(γ),c(γ),p(γ),q(γ)] can be replaced by a contract such as [t(z,γ
),p(z),q(z)]. That is, the regulator, instead of assigning the direct mechanism by asking to
the firm for its type, γ, offers a contract t(z,γ) that induces the firm to implement the
truthful value of C/q-[p-A+Bq]/k and the right level of effort.
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+d] (in number f(γ)dγ) by de, productive efficiency increases by [1-ψ '(e(γ))]de for these
types, which yields social gain (1+λ )[q-ψ '(e(γ))]def(γ)dγ . However this also raise the
rent of types in [γ,γ] (in number F(γ)). From (27) the rent of type γ is increased by ψ''(e(γ
))dedγ, and so is the rent of types γ°<γ. The social cost of the extra rents is λψ''(e(γ))(de)(d
γ)F(γ). At the optimum the marginal cost must equal the marginal benefit, which yields
(30).
Differentiating (30) we get:
∂ ∂γ λ λ ψ γ γ γ γ
ψ γ λ λ γ γ ψ γ
e
e d d F f
e F f e/
/ ( ) ' ' ( ( ))( / ) ( ) / ( )
' ' ( ( )) / ( ) ( ) / ( ) ' ' ' ( ( ))= −
+
+ +
1
1
(31)
As long as the distribution F satisfies the monotone hazard rate property28 (d/dγ
)[dF/df]>0 and ψ'''>0 it follows that the condition (28) is confirmed, that is in the optimal
allocation the effort is decreasing in the firm's type. The same is true for the rent function
that is given in the optimum by:
U e d*( ) ' ( *( % )) %γ ψ β β
γ
γ
= z (32)
where e* is the solution of (30). Therefore the less efficient types, those with an high cost
inefficiency and low demand exerts a lower effort and receives a lower rent than the more
efficient types, that is those with low cost inefficiency and high demand29.
To implement the optimal regulatory contract the regulator must define an
appropriate transfer t(γ) offered to the firm in order to induce truthful behaviour. This
transfer can be intepreted as a function T(.) of the variable z=C/q-(p-A-Bq)/k. The first-
order conditions for truthful revelation are (see appendix A.1):
∂
∂γ
ψ γ ∂
∂γ
t
z
z
+ − =' ( ) 0 (33)
This implies that:
                                                                                                                                            
makes rent extraction difficult, reduces power of incentives and leads to a decrease of effort. This raises
marginal cost and reduces output. If quantity and quality are net complements, lower services are
desirable, and conversly for net substitutes. Asymmetric information lowers quality when the unregulated
monopolist oversupply quality.
28This property amounts to say that as long as the firm's type is getting "better" (more efficicient+higher
demand) it is increasingly less probable that it could become even better.
29Type γ γ=  will receive U=0 and exert low effort; type γ=γ will receive the maximum rent and will
exert the effort e* such that ψ'(e*)=q.
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U(γ)≥  0 for any γ
(26)
while truth telling is guaranteed by the following first- and second- order conditions of
incentive compatibility (see appendix A.1.):
∂ ∂γ ψU e/ ' ( )= − (27)
∂ ∂γe / − ≤1 0 (28)
Thus the regulator designs the contract [t(γ),c(γ),p(γ),q(γ)] that specifies for each
value of γ announced by the firm a net transfer to the firm t(γ), an average cost to realize
c(γ), a price to charge p(γ) and a quantity to sell q(γ), by solving the following optimal
control problem26:
max , , ( )
( ), ( ), ( ), ( )p q e U
W p q e dF z
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
zl q b gm rγ
γ (29)
under constraints (26), (27) and (28), where the welfare function W is a obtained by
substituing out quality from the social welfare function (16), and the cumulative
distribution F(γ ) is the convolution of F1 and F2.
Maximizing the hamiltonian with respect to q and p we obtain conditions which
correspond to (18) and (19), i.e., for a given effort e, the price, quantity and quality are
the same as under complete information about technology and demand parameter.
Moreover from (27) we see that p and q do not affect the rate at which the rent must be
given up to the firm. Maximizing the hamiltonian with respect to e we get:
ψ λ
λ
γ
γ
ψ' ( ) ( )( ) ' ' ( )e q
F
f e= − +1 (30)
If we compare (30) with (20) we see that in order to extract part of the firm's rent the
effort is distorted downward for a given output level, except for the most efficient type γ=
γ27. Equation (30) has a straightforward interpretation. If we raise effort of types in [γ,γ
                                               
26For A and B large enough the program is concave and the optimum is characterized by its first-order
conditions [see Laffont and Tirole (1993) appendix A4.3.].
27Laffont and Tirole show that the level of quality is lower under incomplete information than under
complete information if and only if quantity and quality are net complements. Incomplete information
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optimal level of quality equates the marginal gross surplus plus the shadow cost of public
funds times the increase in revenue to the social marginal cost of quality. Equation (20)
equates the marginal disutility of effort to its marginal utility q, and equation (21) says
that no rent is left to the firm.
3.2.2. Optimal regulation with asymmetric information
Now we take into account the asymmetry of information. The regulator knows neither 
β nor θ and cannot observe e and s. However he observes C, p and q. We assume that the
regulator maximizes expected social welfare and has a prior cumulative distribution F1 on
β β β∈ , , and F2 on θ θ θ∈ , . The firm knows β and θ before contracting.
The regulator knows that users equate their marginal utility of service to the price:
p A ks h Bq= + − −θ  (22)
By using equation (22) it is possible to eliminate the unobservable quality level s in the
users' gross surplus (14), which becomes:
S p q B q pq p A Bqg ( , ) = + − − +
2
1
2
2 2b g (23)
Similarily the cost function becomes:
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The firm objective function will be:
U t e t h
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β and θ enter the cost function and the firm's objective function only through the linear
combination γ=β+hθ/k. This feature, which holds also for the regulator's objective
function, reduces the model to a one-dimensional adverse selection model. We note at this
point that high (low) values of β and θ, which are due respectively to a low (high) cost
efficiency and a low (high) demand, imply high (low) values of γ.
The regulator wishes to maximize social welfare. From the revelation principle we
can restrict the problem to the analysis of direct and truthful revelation contracts. The
individual rationality constraint of the firm is:
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Users derive from the consumption of the transit service a gross surplus:
S q s A ks h q B q ks hg ( , , ) ( ) ( )θ θ θ= + − − − −
2 2
2
2
(14)
where A, B, h e k are known positive constants and θ is a demand parameter24.
The users'/taxpayer net surplus Sn, given by gross surplus net of individual
expenditure and social cost of providing the service, is:
S S pq C pq tn g= − + + − +( )( )1 λ (15)
3.2.1. The complete information case
Under complete information a utilitarian regulator maximizes the sum of consumer
and producer surpluses under the constraint that the firm be willing to partecipate:
Max W q s e S U
q s e
n
( , , )
( , , ) = +m r (16)
s.c. U≥ 0 (17)
Interior maximum is characterized by the first-order conditions25:
p C
p
q−
=
+
λ
λ η1
1 (18)
∂
∂
λ ∂
∂
λS
s
P
s
q C
g
s+ = +( )1 (19)
ψ ' ( )e q= (20)
U=0 (21)
where η=p/Bq. Equation (18) says that service is produced up to the point where the
Lerner index is equal to a Ramsey index time the inverse of elasticity of demand. The
                                               
24Quantity and quality are net complements if k>1 and net substitutes if k<1. Quantity and quality are net
complements if an increase in quality raises the net marginal willingness to pay, that is the difference
between price and marginal cost.
25For B large enough the program [(16), (17)] is concave and its interior maximum is fully characterized
by the first-order conditions.
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1. The transit firm maximizes its own rent while the regulator is concerned with social
welfare. This latter circumstance is justified in that we are assuming the (normative)
point of view of the regulator. That the transit firm maximizes its own monetary rent
seems a good positive assumption at least for private companies. In the case of a
public enterprise it could be intepreted as a typical managerial objective.
2. There is an asymmetry of information between the firm and the regulator in that:
a) The firm is better informed than the regulator about technology and about local
demand conditions. If we think of a regional authority in charge of subsidizing a
multiplicity of local transit suppliers these circumstances seem quite plausible. There
will be always some local specific features affecting technology and demand, that can
not be properly detected by the regional authority.
b) The firm cost-reducing effort can not be directly observed and quality standard is
not easily verifiable by the regulator. While the first point seems obvious the second is
worth some comments. Quality of transit is difficult to check as long as it depends on
local conditions (demographic, geographic, social, ...). Therefore even if quality could
be observed23, in principle, it would be difficoult to quantify and to include in a formal
contract.
Given these circumstances, the regulatory problem appears quite complicated as long
as it is one of two-dimensional adverse selection and two-dimensional moral hazard. An
important simplifying feature is that quality of transit service can usually be observed by
users before use. Thus the regulator might recreate the incentives of an unregulated firm
to provide quality by rewarding the regulated firm on the basis of sales. Laffont and Tirole
(1993), ch. 4, provide a thorough analysis of this regulatory problem. In the following we
give a brief overview of their model. We report some details in an appendix.
The transit firm, which is a local monopoly, produces the service in quantity q with
quality, which can be observed by users but not by regulator, s. Cost function is given by:
C s e q= + −( )β (12)
where β is the technological parameter and e is cost-reducing effort.
Firm's rent is given by:
U t e= − ψ( ) (13)
                                               
23This implies in any case high costs of minitoring and auditing.
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has the socially optimal incentive to reduce cost as it receives all the money it saved.
However, a cost-plus transfer offers no incentive for cost reduction, as long as the firm
does not appropriate of its cost savings.
In the case of rent extraction the logic is reversed. Under a fixed-price transfer any
exogenous reduction in cost is received by the firm. The firm's rent therefore is very
sensitive to the technological environment. On the other hand, a cost-plus contract is ideal
for rent extraction because any exogenous variation in cost is received by the government
and not by the firm.
When the regulator has perfect information about the techonology (there is moral
hazard but no adverse selection), the optimal regulatory contract is a fixed-price transfer20.
When the firm has private information about its technology optimal contracts are
incentive contracts trading off effort inducement, which calls for fixed-fee transfers, and
rent extraction, which  calls for a cost-plus transfer. In general it is optimal for the
regulator to offer a menu of incentive transfers, since the transfer should be tailored to the
firm's information. An inefficient firm should not be regulated with the same contract as
an efficient firm. The regulator discriminates among the different potential types of firm
in the same way the monopolist price discriminates among consumers with different
valuation for quantity or quality.
The regulatory contract emerges as the solution of a mechanism design game, that is
a three step game of incomplete information, where the agent's type is private
information. In step 1 the regulator designs a contract [t(µ ),C(µ )] that specifies for
each announced value of the signal µ sent by the firm a net transfer to the firm t(µ ), and
a cost to realize C(µ ). In step 2 the firm decides to accept or reject the contract. In step
3, the firm which accepts the contract plays the game specified in the contract. The
revelation principle21 shows that, to obtain the highest expected payoff, the principal can
restrict attention to contracts that are accepted by the firm at step 2 and in which at step 3
the firm truthfully reveal its type. As we will show, the revelation principle allows the
regulatory problem to be solved in terms of standard optimal control techniques.
3.2. A model of transit firm regulation
We saw that as long as organization matters, public transit subsidization should be
treated as a regulation problem22. Organizational concern emerges in the public transit
sector because of the following typical circumstances:
                                               
20In this case the fixed fee is optimally set at the lowest level consistent with the firm's partecipation
provided that the firm chooses the effort that minimizes C+ψ (e).
21We are referring here to the textbook treatment contained in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), ch. 7.
22See the paper by Pedersen (1994) for the first attempt, to my knowledge, in this direction.
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Laffont and Tirole develop a theory of regulation based on the following main
features:
0. Regulation is defined through a contract between the regulator and the firm
1. The regulated firm has private information about its technology at the date of
contracting, and its cost-reducing effort is unobserved by the regulator. Cost function
will be written as C C e q= ( , ,...)β , where β is a technological parameter and e is the
cost-reducing effort18. Let ψ(e) denote the firm's managers' disutility of effort
expressed in monetary terms, such that ψ'>0 (effort is costly) and ψ''>0 (the cost of
effort is convex). The model assumes that the regulator has incomplete information
about the cost function but not about the function ψ(e). The firm knows β, and the
regulator has a distribution over β in an interval β β, .
2. Realized cost Cr, the outputs and the prices are verifiable. However the regulator
cannot disentangle the various components of costs.
3. The firm can refuse to produce if the regulatory contract does not guarantee it a
minimum level of utility. Let U denote the firm's expected utility. We normalize the
individually rational level at zero. U≥ 0 will be called the firm's rent.
4. The regulator offers a monetary transfer t, to the firm.
5. The firm and the regulator are risk neutral with respect to income.
6. By accounting convention, the government receives the firm's revenue from charges
to consumer, pays the firm's cost and a net transfer t. Transfers are of the linear type
in realized cost Cr, i.e. t=a-bCr, where a is a "fixed fee" and b is the fraction of costs
incurred by the firm.
7. Firm's objective function is given by the total amount of transfer less monetary
disutility of effort, i.e. U t e= − ψ( )
8. The regulator designs a regulatory contract in order to maximize total surplus in
society, given that he faces a shadow cost of public funds λ >0.
Ignoring for the moment output and quality decisions, the regulator has two
conflicting goals: to promote cost reduction and to extract firm's rent19. In order to see
why these two goals are in conflicts consider the two polar cases of cost-plus (i.e. b=0)
and fixed-price (i.e. b=1) transfers. A fixed-price contract induces the highest amount of
effort because it makes the firm residual claimant for its cost savings. Therefore the firm
                                               
18By convention Cβ >0, i.e. a high β corresponds to an inefficient technology, and Ce<0 and Cee>0, i.e.
effort reduces cost at a decreasing rate. Omitted variables in the cost function may be the vector of outputs
q1,..qn, of goods 1,..., n or the level of service quality, s.
19In this case ex-post social welfare for an utilitarian regulator is given by:
S-(1+λ )(t+β -e)+t-ψ (e)=S-(1+λ )[β -e+ψ (e)]-U
where S is the consumer surplus due to the project. The crucial feature of this welfare function is that the
regulator dislikes leaving a rent to the firm.
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Within this context new questions arise concerning public transit subsidies. If
organization matters, subsidy must be granted not only in order to let the sector produce in
quantities and  qualities otherwise not available but also to solve organizational problems,
i.e. taking into account the lack of control on the regulator side. Therefore the question
becomes: How can a public transit firm be subsidized in order to reach some specific
goals and given that it has its own rationality? The incentives theory provides the right
theoretical background for answering this question.
3. THE INCENTIVES THEORY APPROACH
The incentives theory provides a solution to the so called principal-agent problems.
These problems emerge whenever a principal wants to induce an agent to take some
action which is costly to the agent, as long as it will require some effort. The principal
may be unable to directly observe the action of the agent, but instead observes some
output that is determined, at least in part, by the actions of the agent. The principal's
problem is to design an incentive payment for the agent that induces the latter to make the
best decision from the principal's viewpoint. He should do this by taking into account two
sorts of constraints.
Since the agent may have another opportunity available that gives him some
reservation level of utility, the principal should design an incentive payment that ensures
that the agent gets at least this reservation level. Otherwise the agent would not be willing
to partecipate. This is the so-called partecipation constraint or individual rationality
constraint.
The second constraint on the problem is that of incentive compatibility: given the
incentive schedule defined by the principal, the agent will pick the best action for
himself. As long as the agent attempts to maximize his own return he will exploit all his
informational advantage in order to get the maximum payment and to exert the minimum
effort. Since the principal cannot choose the agent's action directly but can only influence
it by the incentive payment, he must set it by taking into account the utility maximizing
behaviour of the agent.
In order to make these concepts clear we present in the next paragraph the theory of
regulation recently developed by Laffont and Tirole (1993). Paragraph 2 provides an
application of this theory that fits into our specific subsidization problem. In the last
section we summarize the general rules for an incentive use of transit subsidy.
3.1. Incentives theory of regulation: the Laffont and Tirole framework
Public Transit Subsidy: from the Economics of Welfare to the Theory of Incentives 11
These empirical findings confirm theoretical deductions about the public enterprise
by suggesting that public transit firms generally have non conventional objectives and
therefore follow non standard behavioural programs. In general it is therefore reasonable
to assume that transit firm's objective function does not coincide with regulator's objective
function. It is in this context that organization may matter.
2.3. Why does organization matter?
Organization matters as long as the agent in charge of producing and supplying the
public transit services is different from the regulator who should subsidize or regulate
him. This difference becomes relevant from the point of view of organization if both the
following conditions hold:
1) The agent and the regulator should have different, conflicting objective functions. In
this respect it is not relevant if the agent is a public or a private firm.
2) There should be some asymmetry of information that favours the agent in face of the
regulator.
If 1) holds but 2) does not, it happens that, since the regulator knows everything about the
agent, he could always put her in the conditions to deliberatly reach his own preferred
outcome. In the reverse situation the agent would have the incentive to reveal all his
private information to the regulator. If both 1) and 2) hold the regulator has an imperfect
control of the regulated agent. Therefore organization matters as it becomes economically
relevant to cope with the imperfectness of control.
In the early perfomance approach the agent could not share the regulator's objective
function because of lack of rationality. However it was implicitly assumed that the agent
would be willing to do. Therefore the regulatory problem was to identify a good substitute
for his objective function that the agent could easily follow.
This organizational arrangement is quite unrealistic since there are good reasons to
assume that the agent is not willing to follow the regulator's prescriptions. A private
transit firm obviously has objectives that are conflicting with those inspiring the regulator.
Otherwise free market arrangement would be preferable. Moreover we have seen that the
public enterprise has its own specific objective functions. These might be significantly
different from a "simple" social welfare function. As far as information is concerned, it is
quite realistic to assume that it will be asymmetric, with a fully informed management of
the regulated firm and with imperfectly or incompletely informed regulator. His lack of
information results from lack of observation. Certain actions of the firm cannot be directly
observed by the regulator. Alternatively or cumulatively, certain information about the
state of the world can be observed only by the firm, not by the regulator. Therefore we are
generally confident that organization should matter.
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2.2. Positive analyses of public transport firms
All the normative models we have examined up to now contain a conventional
treatment of cost relationships. It is usually assumed that the transit firm is a public
enterprise that produces sustaining costs given by a canonical, well-behaved, cost
function. Therefore managers are not only expected to determine level of service and
standards of quality according to some welfare calculus but are also implicitly requested
to define inputs mix that minimize total cost. Many theoretical and empirical positive
analyses of transport firms behaviour are actually conflict with this simplified picture.
The more recent literature of public finance suggests that the behaviour of public
enterprise is such that cost minimization at given prices is constrained by demand level,
available technology and some political conditions which may introduce a preference for
some specific inputs. Therefore public enterprise should not necessarily produce output at
minimum cost. In the specific analytical approach suggested by Rees (1984) public
enterprise decisions are assumed to result from a negotiation process between the firm's
management and the internal labour union. The interaction of managerial preferences14,
union preferences and political control might easily lead far from standard cost
minimization15.
Several statistical analyses, for example those by Pucher et al. (1983), Pickrell (1985)
and Button (1988), showed that a relationship exists between the amount of subsidy and
the cost level of transit. Transit subsidy is positively correlated with unitary costs and
level of service and negatively correlated with labour productivity16. Another piece of
evidence comes from the comparative studies of private and public companies. These
studies repeatedly concluded that, also in the public transit sector,  the former are
commonly more efficient than the latter17.
                                               
14Potential objectives of public enterprise managers, suggested in the literature, are, among the other,
budget maximization, output or revenue maximization and even price stabilization or energy consumption
minimization. See Bös (1986).
15De Borger (1993) recently applied this framework to the case of Belgian national railroad company. In
his model the company does not minimize cost with respect to market prices of inputs but with respect to
shadow prices generated by political constraint and bargaining power of labour union. Empirical
estimation of the shadow cost function suggests that the shadow wage varies from 67% to 86% of
observed wage and that this implies a misallocation of labour such that 4,4% more labour has been
employed than stricly required.
16Pucher et al. (1983) show that the impact on unitary costs is higher the further is the firm from the
government agency subsidizing it. Similar results have been reached by Filippini, Maggi and Prioni
(1992). Bly and Oldfield (1986) by using regression with lagged variables provide some evidence on the
causality links from subsidy to unitary cost increase.
17Some analyses of the British bus deregulation experience confirm this prescription. Heseltine and
Silkcock (1990) for instance report that the newly privatized transit firm lowered quality, increased prices
and reduced unitary costs by cutting labour, i.e. by redefining productive mix.
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value of social loss on the last quality improvement. In this case it is impossible to
evaluate the integral term by means of simple marginal experiments on price and quality.
Therefore public transit firm will not be able to fix the optimal level of quality as long as
it does not develop a demand simulation model. Since this is quite difficult, the regulator
should provide the firm with the simple commercial rules we mentioned above.
Ridership maximization and vehicle-mile maximization, both subject to a budget
constraint, have been the natural candidates examined in literature. Papers by Nash
(1978), Glaister and Collings (1978) and Bös (1978) stressed the relative merits of the
former in comparison to the latter. However the analysis does not yield any general
conclusion. On the contrary the more general result in this stream of literature is the
"negative" conclusion11 reached by Frankena (1983).
Frankena demonstrated that, in quite general conditions, both mileage and ridership
maximization under a budget constraint may lead a non profit monopolist to fix a tariff
and to supply a quality higher than those implemented in the second-best allocation
defined by (10) and (11). In particular this happens if marginal valuation of quality
increase as long as consumers' total willingness to pay reduces12, i.e. if bxq>0, and
marginal cost does not change with the quality of service, i.e. Cxq=0. In these
circumstances a ridership maximizer will produce a level of quality higher than socially
optimal because of the excessive weight he attaches to the high valuation of quality of
marginal users. The same holds true for a mileage maximizer. By changing assumptions
about demand, i.e. by assuming that bxq<0, Frankena demonstrated that ridership
maximization enabled the firm to choose lower tariffs and quality levels than socially
optimal, while the previous conclusion still holds with mileage maximization. Finally, if
bxq=0 ridership maximization may lead to the social best. Frankena concluded that
without knowing the demand and cost functions one cannot determine whether ridership
maximization would lead to levels of fares and quality below, equal or above those which
would be second-best efficient under the budget constraint. Moreover, unless one has
information about transport firm's objective function, demand and cost function, one
cannot determine which subsidy formula would be the most socially efficient13.
                                               
11The narrowness of these theoretical results partially justify the relevance, in public transit economics, of
a-theoretical approaches to performance analysis.
12In other words, willingness to pay for quality improvement is assumed to be higher among users with a
lower total willingness to pay.
13In a previous paper, Frankena (1981), the author considered the effect of different subsidization schemes
(lump sum, matching on cost and on passenger) on the performance of transit firms with different
objective functions.
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In this last respect, as we will show in the next section, organization counts. First of
all, by referring to some early papers, we will treat the problem of defining  commercial
criteria for public transit firms as good proxies to cost-benefit rules. Therefore we will
change perspective by moving to positive analysis of public transport firms. We will show
that these firms do not follow prescribed objectives.
2. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONCERN
2.1. Optimal commercial criteria for public transit firms
The organizational concern originally emerged among the advocates of the standard
welfarist approach as a problem of bounded rationality. Since the public transit firms are
separate bodies from the regulator subsidizing them, it might be that they are not rational
enough to implement, by themself, a welfare maximization program. Therefore it is
necessary to provide them with simple commercial criteria which might approximate
social welfare objectives.
In order to implement a social welfare maximizing program, i.e. a couple (x,q) of
quantity, x, and quality, q, of transit service, each firm should solve the following
problem:
Max b v q dv xb x q b x q x C x q
x q
x
,
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
0
1z − + + −λ b g (9)
where b(x,q) is the inverse demand function for transit.
From (9), the first order necessary conditions, defining price and quality of service,
are the following:
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Ramsey's rule (10) is easy to implement. The transit firm knows all the elements
composing it, or can easily discover them through marginal price and quality adjustments.
On the contrary it is not so simple to implement rule (11) that prescribes to increase
quality as long as net average benefit over the set of inframarginal consumers exceeds the
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demand between periods. Simulations performed do not bring any unexpected results. For
a quite broad range of values of the parameters and marginal costs, second-best subsidy
should be higher during off-peak periods.
De Borger et al. (1993) recently applied an improved version of Glaister and Lewis
model of urban transport in Belgium. Social cost includes congestion costs, environmental
costs and accidents. In this way the model provides an exhaustive treatment of second-best
arguments for transit subsidy. Results, obtained also considering car user price as a policy
variable, indicate that each tariff should be set at the corresponding marginal social cost.
With a binding budget constraint optimal tariffs will be fixed on the basis of a Ramsey
rule and will be higher than the respective marginal social cost, both in peak and off-peak.
In the simulations performed by De Borger et al. the extent of this increase for bus is quite
surprising, especially if compared to that of private cars.
1.3. Some criticisms of the standard welfarist approach
As we mentioned before the welfarist approach has been criticized for several
reasons. The high level of spatial aggregation, insufficient time disaggregation, a
simplified treatment of cost functions and the lack of explicit geographic content are some
of the more relevant internal limits of models strictly based on this approach. Moreover
we should not diseregard external limits due to the narrow definition of the mobility
system. The welfarist approach  focuses only on direct and indirect effects which pass
through final users, identifying mobility needs with transport demand. In this way the
empirical relevance of the approach may be quite limited in scope.
In the following we will not discuss approaches coping with these types of
limitations10. We do believe that the standard welfarist approach has merits that largely
exceed its limits. However there is one more typical external limit, concerning the
organizational contents, that we consider interesting to focus on here. This is the limit that
makes the approach "out-of-date".
The standard welfarist approach deliberatly disregards any references to the
organizations governing supply of public transit services. It assumes that organization is
simplified to a single decision maker that is a social welfare maximizer. It could be a
regulator, as implicitly assumed in the cost-benefit analysis approach, or the transit firm,
as is done in the second-best pricing problem. This drastic reduction changes the standard
welfarist models to simple tools for evaluating transport policy options, but leaves
important questions concerning the real implementation of those policy options
completely unanswered.
                                               
10Two examples of such approaches are the application of Activity Analysis to public transit subsidization
provided by Goodwin et al. (1983) and that of the so-called Lewes Approach, see Searle (1987).
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In order to obtain optimal tariffs Glaister and Lewis solved the following
maximization problem9:
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where CBp, peak bus service production cost, is dependent on its own level of use,  XBp,
and, because of congestion, on car use during the same period, XAp; αBp and αBf are a set
of base prices, considerably higher than those under consideration. Thus the difference
between the expenditure function evaluated at the two points is the compensating
variation, i.e. the amount of money that would be required to compensate for an increase
in tariffs from p to α. The remaining two terms in square brackets are the operating
subsidies required on the peak and off-peak bus services. The sum of the compensating
variation and the gross revenues is the total willingness to pay from which must be
subtracted the various operating costs.
Differentiating (6), equating to zero and rearranging terms we obtain the following
expressions for the optimal bus tariffs:
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where ηji represent the direct and cross elasticities of compensated demand, SAp is the
marginal social cost of a peak car passenger per mile and ρ is a combination of elasticities
of demand reasonably positive and smaller than 1. Assuming that the modes are
substitutes, (7) and (8) indicate that both peak and off-peak prices will be below
respective marginal social costs by an amount proportional to marginal social cost of car
use, both because of the possibilities of attracting peak car users directly and reallocating
                                               
9We removed rail modes in order to simplify formal treatment.
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Even though METS is probably the most ambitious operational model for allocating
subsidies it nevertheless suffers from several internal limitations. Gwilliam (1987)
provides the following ordered list of criticisms8:
• With respect to the objectives encompassed it has been pointed out that the use of the
cost-benefit framework does not provide for any environmental or distributional
objectives.
• The model is not disaggregated by time of day and therefore it does not properly
assess welfare effects due to peak shifting policies.
• The high level of spatial aggregation of the model and the lack of explicit
geographical content result in an uncertain estimate of the real effect of congestion.
• The short-term nature of the model does not enable the impact of subsidy over cost
structure and supply capacity to be evaluated.
1.2. Transit subsidization as a pricing problem
In Welfare Economics we do not find a direct definition of subsidy. We could say
that it is a derived concept. Subsidy emerges as the difference between an opportune unit
price and the unit cost for producing the quantity of service demanded at that price.
Therefore welfare economists are mainly concerned with the extension of the concept of
opportune price. This has usually been accomplished through the definition of second and
third best solution to first-best deficiencies. Production costs usually do not play any
relevant role. With given technology and perfectly elastic supply of inputs it could be
assumed that the service demanded is produced at minimum costs. Therefore the standard
pricing problems contain a traditional cost function.
The model developed by Glaister and Lewis (1978) moves within this framework. It
identifies optimal pricing schemes of urban public transit in presence of congestion and
defines the second-best subsidy that allows its social costs to be internalised. The authors
consider three means of transport: car, bus and train. Each mode is considered at peak (p)
and off-peak time (f). Individual utility depends on personal use level and on time losses
associated with each modes. Since these depend, through speed-flow relationships, on the
levels of collective use of each one of the six means, it follows that individual utility
functions could be written as uh(xh,X), where xh and X are respectively the vectors of
individual and collective use for each modes considered. Therefore individual expenditure
functions can be written as gh(ph,X,uh) leading to the aggregate expenditure:
                                               
8All the limits listed are escapable in theory. Dodgson and Topham (1987) introduced distributional
elements in the cost-benefit calculus. Bly and Oldfield (1987) extended the model in order to consider
environmental impact, capacity optimization and optimal mixing of tariff reduction and quality
improvement policies. However all these extensions would imply higher costs of model building.
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The numerator of equation (4) contains an integral term. It measures the variation of
consumer surplus due to an increase in quality of service. No small experiment with price
and quality will generate the information required to evaluate this integral term. The
reason for this is that quality changes affect the welfare of the entire set of inframarginal
consumers. The data generated by local changes in the parameters will not yield such
estimates. Therefore in order to calculate equation (4) it is necessary to build a model that
replicates the reactions of the entire set of inframarginal consumers4. Moreover we must
rescale these effects in terms of welfare measures.
At this point the problem becomes transport-specific. In the generalized travel cost
approach the problem is the building of behavioural models explaining the impact of
quality of service on walking, waiting, boarding and travel time. The impact on this time
requirements of the whole set of inframarginal consumers might then be translated into
monetary terms by means of value of time coefficients5.
Once made operational, equations (3) and (4) provide a sound basis for allocating
public transit subsidies to different towns in the same region6. An improved version of this
simple model has been made operational in England by Stephen Glaister. METS (Model
for Evaluating Transport Subsidies)7, was able to calculate equations (3) and (4) by
solving quite complicated local mobility simulation models. It considered a multiplicity of
transport modes: car, bus, rail and metro. Consumers choose on the basis of the
generalized travel cost of each alternatives. Generalized travel costs are calculated through
speed-flow relationships evaluated at equilibrium points. In this way METS allows to
estimate modal impacts produced by pricing and quality policies by measuring their effect
on congestion reduction and other second-best concerns.
                                               
4Spence (1975) realizes that this is the main problem faced by the regulator of a monopolist "with
quality". The regulator should provide the non-market informations needed in order to evaluate total
willingness to pay for quality improvements.
5This is the approach followed by Dodgson (1987). He solves equation (5) in terms of a relationship
between vehicles-km and waiting-time. See also Tisato (1992) for an improved user cost model.
6See Evans (1985) for the definition of different equalization schemes in transit transfers. Dodgson (1987),
by referring to a sample of Australian cities, suggested that an increase in vehicle-km would not be
welfare improving in most of the towns.
7For a detailed description of METS see Glaister (1987).
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different combinations of adjustments in tariff and quality of transit service with respect to
the initial situation. Therefore cost-benefit analysis identifies the adjustments in tariff and
quality of service that maximizes social welfare given a budget constraint on the total
amount of subsidy. The main difficulty in these calculations is the presence of a quality
index both in the demand and cost functions1.
Let D(b,q) and C(D(b,q,),q) be respectively the demand and the short-run cost
function of transit, where b is the tariff and q is the quality index2. For any initial situation
(b0,q0), define the consumer surplus S, and the producer surplus P, by:
S D v q dv
b
=
∞
z ( , )0
0
(1)
P b D b q C D b q q= −0 0 0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ),b g (2)
Given this initial situation (b0,q0), it is possible to calculate the net benefit for each
amount of money spent alternatively to lower the tariff or to improve the quality of
service. In the first case, the net benefit per unit of subsidy will be given by the equation:
dB
dT
W
b
P
b
b C
b b C
b
b
D b
D b
= =
− −
+ −
∂
∂
∂
∂
ε
ε
( )
( )
0
0 0
(3)
where dBb is the net benefit due to a tariff reduction, measured by the variation in total
surplus W=S+P, dTb is the required increase in subsidy, given by the variation of
producer surplus and b represents tariff elasticity of transit demand. Equation (3) is quite
easy to calculate since it is made of known ingredients: tariff, tariff elasticity of demand
and marginal cost of service3.
This is not so in the case of subsidization of an improved quality of service. In this
case we have:
                                               
1These circumstances justify a "transportation" treatment of public transit subsidy.
2q might be either a scalar or a vector.
3If the tariff is initially set at marginal cost there is no space for increasing net social surplus. Otherwise if
marginal cost is zero the increase in net social benefit will depend only on tariff elasticity of demand.
Subsidizing a tariff reduction will be more welfare improving the more initial tariff exceed marginal cost
and demand is elastic to the tariff.
Public Transit Subsidy: from the Economics of Welfare to the Theory of Incentives 2
INTRODUCTION
A subsidy is the difference between production costs of a good and revenues from
sales to final users. Its aim is to restore profitability in the production of a good, in order
to make it available in quantities and qualities otherwise not provided by the normal
functioning of the market. Therefore subsidization is deliberately performed by an agent
in order to let some activities exist and grow.
Good reasons for subsidizing public transit have been repeatedly suggested by
economists. Standard arguments are: economies of scale, second-best problems,
redistribution in kind, option value, imperfect information. For all these reasons it might
be socially useful to sustain the production of public transit. But to what extent should we
provide this support? Standard welfarist approach gave the answers. These answers will
be analyzed in section 1.
Among the several limitations of the standard welfarist approach we find that what
makes it an "outdated" framework is its complete disregard of organizational concerns. In
section 2 we show how these issues have been normatively treated by the former
advocates of the standard welfarist approach and how relevant they are in terms of
positive explanations of public firms' behaviour.
Once we explicitly introduce organizational issues we should find new theoretical
paradigms allowing another answer to be answered: how to subsidize a public transit firm
in order to reach some specific goals and given that it has its own rationality? The theory
of incentives provides such a paradigm. In section 3 we provide a model of regulation
that fits very well into the typical situations we face. Then, in the last section, it will be
quite easy to analyze past and recent experiences of performance-based subsidization.
1. THE STANDARD WELFARIST APPROACH
In the welfarist approach the optimal level of subsidy is defined through a welfare
calculus of costs and benefits. Its comprehensiveness is limited only by the extent that
direct and indirect effects, which pass through final users of the transport system, can be
measured. The literature reports two ways of performing this welfare calculus: cost-
benefit analysis and approaches based on optimal pricing of public utilities.
1.1. Cost-benefit analysis of public transit subsidy
Cost-benefit analysis allows us to define subsidization rules on the basis of a welfare
comparison between alternative uses of subsidies. The alternative uses are given by
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ABSTRACT:
Public Transit is publicly managed almost all over Europe. Public intervention in this sector
is due to market failures: economies of scale and misperceptions of social and private costs may
cause an insufficient supply of transit services. These arguments have been thouroughly analyzed
within the standard welfarist approach to the theory and practice of subsidization. Ramsey rules
and cost-benefit analysis emerged as useful devices for the definition of subsidy allocation.
However remedies to market failures should be traded-off against government failures. Lack of
incentives, X-inefficiency, regulatory capture, bureaucracy power are common facts in the
internal organization of public administration. If a public sector utility, for some reasons, can not
be completely privatized, it may be "almost" privatized by means of quasi-market mechanisms.
Auctioning, yardistick competition, incentive schemes, auditing, regulation through competition
are the keywords for the renewed public involvment in public transit. All these mechanisms can
be properly studied within the theoretical format of the incentives theory. This approach helps us
to understand past experiences of transit firms incentives scheme and to appreciate the relevance
of the empirical analysis of performance indicators. An important question that emerges is the
definition of operational incentive contracts. In this paper we will discuss this problem by
referring to past and recent experiments with performance based subsidization programs.
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